Symbol Revenue Estimate Current Q Operating Profit Estimate Current Q EPS Estimate Current Q EBITDA Estimate Current Q Revenue Estimate Next Q Sequential Revenue Growth Estimate, Percent Operating Profit Estimate Next Q EPS Estimate Next Q EBITDA Estimate Next Q Revenue Estimate Full Year Operating Profit Estimate Full Year EPS Estimate Full Year EBITDA Estimate Full Year Revenue Estimate Next Year Operating Profit Estimate Next Year EPS Estimate Next Year EBITDA Estimate Next Year ADSK 581.4 167.6 0.54 176.2 582.7 0.21% 161.6 0.52 169.0 2,154.2 591.6 1.91 635.2 2,457.8 700.6 2.24 733.3 AXTI 16.0 1.4 0.04 -- 16.2 1.00% 1.4 0.04 -- 56.6 5.1 0.15 -- 71.3 7.2 0.21 -- BEAS 428.5 113.6 0.22 125.6 384.5 -10.27% 83.3 0.17 88.9 1,523.1 338.5 0.69 356.0 1,662.9 397.6 0.77 429.6 BORL 66.1 (2.5) (0.04) 3.0 65.6 -0.82% 0.2 0.00 -- 273.5 (12.5) (0.20) 9.7 271.8 3.6 0.01 19.0 CATS 17.5 0.0 0.03 -- 17.5 0.12% 0.3 0.03 -- 75.5 2.3 0.18 -- 76.0 3.9 0.19 -- CRM 209.2 4.9 0.04 8.4 228.5 9.25% 8.6 0.06 13.3 741.0 14.4 0.14 37.9 1,027.6 52.9 0.32 75.8 CTRP 46.0 15.4 0.21 15.4 48.1 4.52% 15.6 0.21 15.7 160.0 53.1 0.75 56.4 242.8 81.0 1.09 84.7 DELL 16,249.1 959.1 0.36 1,047.2 15,834.9 -2.55% 881.8 0.35 976.9 61,354.4 3,627.3 1.37 4,217.6 65,258.1 4,045.2 1.56 4,572.0 DWA 276.8 110.7 0.72 119.5 188.7 -31.81% 48.0 0.38 53.6 749.0 273.9 1.94 282.4 664.6 191.5 1.47 215.1 ESPD 38.5 -- 0.01 -- -- #VALUE! -- 0.20 -- 158.2 5.6 0.07 25.1 1,252.9 126.7 0.70 126.7 ESST 18.4 0.2 0.00 -- 15.0 -18.48% (0.9) (0.02) -- 71.1 -- (0.07) -- 65.3 (1.7) (0.03) -- GMKT 72.8 11.3 0.23 13.9 70.4 -3.35% 9.9 0.19 13.0 241.0 29.8 0.69 38.3 315.2 49.1 0.92 62.7 IMMR 9.2 (1.6) 0.00 (0.8) -- #VALUE! -- -- -- 34.0 125.6 4.16 129.8 40.0 (7.1) 0.00 (2.9) LEAP 428.9 28.4 (0.17) 113.6 454.6 5.99% 26.3 (0.04) 115.2 1,624.4 72.2 (0.86) 378.3 1,926.6 107.8 (0.38) 484.5 MENT 274.2 77.7 0.72 84.2 195.0 -28.87% 11.5 0.08 -- 856.6 104.0 0.99 131.3 893.8 122.8 1.07 131.3 MXWL 15.3 (3.2) (0.21) (1.9) 15.0 -1.71% (3.3) (0.18) (1.4) 55.6 (16.7) (1.03) (12.1) 67.1 (10.0) (0.57) (3.3) NIHD 913.6 177.0 0.59 253.8 972.1 6.41% 205.5 0.70 280.9 3,266.8 609.0 1.98 904.9 4,262.7 910.8 3.07 1,249.4 NT 3,281.2 315.9 0.47 404.8 2,605.5 -20.59% 101.8 0.12 193.2 11,032.6 464.8 0.52 705.9 11,410.1 854.9 1.18 1,123.3 NVLS 319.4 30.0 0.23 48.2 329.7 3.23% 39.3 0.29 57.3 1,365.1 179.1 1.35 244.9 1,473.2 225.7 1.71 284.0 OVTI 226.2 27.3 0.47 28.0 198.0 -12.49% 19.0 0.33 15.3 831.8 90.9 1.66 94.1 905.6 81.6 1.60 100.8 SNIC 31.0 (4.7) (0.14) (3.5) 31.7 2.29% (2.8) (0.07) (0.8) 133.9 (0.7) (0.12) 1.9 142.3 8.7 0.25 16.3 SONS 97.3 7.1 0.03 -- 90.7 -6.78% 6.4 0.01 -- 320.4 (67.9) (0.12) (2.7) 406.2 44.2 0.12 71.1 UTSI 640.6 (49.6) (0.43) -- 563.5 -12.04% (27.7) (0.28) -- 2,301.4 (208.7) (1.85) (148.8) 2,290.3 (212.0) (1.31) (35.9) VIA/B 3,994.3 1,003.5 0.83 1,095.6 2,931.9 -26.60% 637.9 0.50 748.2 13,198.6 3,008.6 2.35 3,410.1 13,909.2 3,282.5 2.65 3,707.2 WJCI -- (1.8) (0.02) 0.3 -- #VALUE! -- (0.02) -- -- (8.7) (0.12) -- -- -- 0.02 -- XMSR 304.0 (159.5) (0.63) (111.3) 315.0 3.62% (80.9) (0.39) (39.2) 1,133.7 (479.0) (2.06) (282.3) 1,361.4 (396.2) (1.62) (185.3)
Tuesday, February 26, 2008
Earnings Estimate Cheat Sheet – February 26-29, 2008
Monday, February 25, 2008
Sandisk meets with analysts, releases 10K
There's an analyst meeting going on right now. They say business so far this quarter is about as they forecast – lousy. Sandisk files their 10K. There's some elaboration on the off-balance sheet aspects of their joint ventures with Toshiba to produce NAND flash. The basic gist of it is they own 49.9% (just not enough to not have to include the operations in consolidated results) of the JVs. They're on the hook for 50% of the output. If they incorrectly forecast demand they get stuck with a lot of raw NAND at cost plus a mark-up. They don't really get into how much of a liability that can be but the ventures have been ramping capacity at a significant pace. There's some currency double-talk. They say they don't really hedge but then say they've got a 500mm+ position short the dollar. They also say they're buying product from Japan that's being produced in China. Confusing. They intend to spend $4 billion on further off-balance sheet fab equipment over the next 3 years and will likely have to sell debt to raise the cash. That's a very big number, 4 billion. On February 19th, 2008, Toshiba and Sandisk signed a memorandum of understanding to begin a new 300mm fabrication facility in 2010 – presumably this will involve more spending when the time comes. The potential for debt issuance is not a new issue as analysts have discussed it but it's one thing when business is ripping and the company says things are so good they need to invest further in the business. It's quite another thing when business looks weak. Why do they continually structure the JV to hide the real P&L of the business? I think it's a multi-billion dollar blind spot in the story and I don't like it.
NAND flash contract prices decline
DRAMExchange is quoting NAND contract for the second half of February down 4-6%. End markets are weak and retail inventories seem likely to be high in this environment. I continue to recommend avoiding companies in the memory supply chain with the exception of Micron, where I think CMOS sensor market share gains, NAND flash accounting and reduced spending by competitors in commodity DRAM will benefit the company on a relative basis.
Electronic Arts (ERTS) bids $26 for Take Two (TTWO)
First they offered $25. Take Two said that's too low. Then they offered $26. That increment is almost obnoxious… but it's also probably correct. Take Two has never successfully translated that success into anything outside of that one game. Their other attempts have been flops of varying degree. Electronic Arts looking to buy Take Two seems both consistent and at odds with their model. On one hand, they're a franchise company – sports titles, the majority of their sales, get a product refresh on an annual basis. The annual refresh has the benefit of keeping them at the cutting edge of game development and creates a virtual recurring revenue stream as sports fans want current line-ups to enhance their vicarious thrill. On the other, Grand Theft Auto is a highly controversial title. It's been blamed for inspiring a handful of disturbed teens to shoot people. The last revision was rated for mature audiences only. It's not the kind of image one associates with Electronic Arts. In some respects, you're a bad guy if you market GTA to the same crowd you market Harry Potter to. The franchise risk is too great for another player without a vast library of recurring titles to offset the potential foibles of GTA in the future. Few of the other video game companies have shown an ability to develop and maintain successful franchises – Activision has done it with Guitar Hero but their dependence on it has yet to be tested. They're locked up with Vivendi now and won't get involved in Take Two. There won't be another buyer. Take Two is stupid to reject the offer. GTA is late in the sequel stage. Sequels open huge and fade fast and the later you are in the franchise, the more that effect tends to be felt. Rockstar Games, the creators of the game, seem almost arrogant in their pursuit of adrenal fantasies. The developers aren't locked up. It will be very difficult for Electronic Arts to hold onto people in the transition as the Rockstars are likely to reject the corporate hegemony wholesale. Take Two claims the offer comes at exactly the wrong time, as GTA 4 will be a savior for the company stock price. I would point out that Take Two has an almost notorious inability to predict their future. There are few companies that have changed their guidance intra-quarter as much as they have. Electronic Arts bid $25. Take Two said it was too low. Electronic Arts bid $26. Those are not the increments of a buyer looking to pay any price. I would sell Take Two here if I owned it.
Take Two has a great franchise in Grand Theft Auto, a no-rules shoot 'em up where 12-35 year old males the world over get an outlet for their criminal nature. It's fun. I don't know where the Grand Theft Auto movie is but its inevitable.